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Abstract 
Miscalibration can be defined as the fact that people think that their knowledge is more precise than it actually is. In a 
typical miscalibration experiment, subjects are asked to provide subjective confidence intervals. A very robust finding 
is that subjects provide too narrow intervals at the 90% level. As a result a lot less than 90% of correct answers fall 
inside the 90% intervals provided. As miscalibration is linked with bad results on an experimental financial market 
(Biais et al., 2005) and entrepreneurial success is positively correlated with good calibration (Regner et al., 2006), it 
appears interesting to look for a way to cure or at least reduce miscalibration. Previous attempts to remove the 
miscalibration bias relied on extremely long and tedious procedures. Here, we design an experimental setting that 
provides several different incentives, in particular strong monetary incentives i.e. that make miscalibration costly. Our 
main result is that a thirty-minute training session has an effect on men''s calibration but no effect on women''s.
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     1 Introduction
In the past decades Economists and Psychologists documented a long list of biases , i.e.
substantial and systematic deviations from the predictions of standard economic theory 1.
Many economists will argue that these biases only matter if they survive in an economic
environment. In other words, if correct incentives are provided subjects should realize that
they are making costly mistakes and then change the way they make such decisions in
further decision tasks. In this paper we test this claim regarding a particular bias, namely
miscalibration. We then create an experimental setting that provides a lot of incentives
(decisions have monetary consequences, successful others can be imitated, feedbacks are
provided, repeated trials are used, etc). Finally, we test in a subsequent decision task
whether subjects still display some miscalibration.
What is miscalibration and why is it important to economists?
Calibration is related to the capacity of an individual to choose a given level of risk. In a
typical experiment designed to measure miscalibration, subjects are asked to provide sub-
jective conﬁdence intervals. For example, if the question is "What was the unemployment
rate in France for the ﬁrst trimester of 2007?" and the subject provides the 90% conﬁdence
interval [7%,15%], it means that the subject thinks that there is a 90% chance that this in-
terval contains the correct answer. A perfectly calibrated subject’s intervals should contain
the correct answer 90% of the time. In fact, a robust ﬁnding is that almost all subjects
are miscalibrated. On average, 90% subjective conﬁdence intervals only contain the correct
answer between, say, 30% and 50% of the time 2. Glaser et al. (2005) found an even stronger
miscalibration using professional traders.
Miscalibration is a bias having important economic consequences, since miscalibrated
people suﬀer losses on experimental markets (Bonnefon et al., 2005; Biais et al., 2005).
Furthermore, it is likely that such a pathology aﬀects the behavior of real traders acting on
real markets. Therefore, it does make sense for economists to try to reduce miscalibration
and to study the best incentives to do so.
Several psychologists have used various techniques to reduce miscalibration (Pickhardt
and Wallace, 1974; Adams and Adams, 1958; Lichtenstein and Fischhoﬀ, 1980), with little
success so far.
This paper proposes to provide a maximum of incentives to reduce miscalibration. The
main result is that our experimental setting succeeds in reducing overconﬁdent miscalibration
but only for males.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the experimental
design. Section 3 presents the results while section 4 discusses them and provides some
concluding remarks.
1A list of almost a hundred of such biases can be found at
http : ==en:wikipedia:org=wiki=List_of_cognitive_biases
2see Lichtenstein and Fischhhoﬀ (1977) for a survey and (Klayman et al., 1999) for variables that aﬀect
miscalibration
12 Experimental design
The experimental subjects were divided into two groups. The subjects of the ﬁrst group
attended a training session and then performed a baseline treatment aiming at measuring
their miscalibration according to the standard protocol. The principle of this training session
is to oﬀer a whole set of experimental incentives that enhance learning (monetary incentives,
tournament, feedback, loss framing). The second group, the control group, performs the
baseline treatment only. Since there is no simple incentive scheme that rewards correct
calibration in the standard calibration task 3, we chose to consider a task similar to the
calibration task in which we can provide the necessary incentives. This task, described in
the following section aims at making the subjects realize they have a hard time calibrating
the level of risk they wish to take. After having completed this training task, subjects have
to complete a standard calibration task for which we only provide incentives for the following
evaluation of how subjects did in the calibration task as in Cesarini et al. (2006). A control
group who did not go through the training task also completed the calibration task to enable
us to measure the eﬀect of the training task.
2.1 The training period
In the training period, the participants were asked to answer a set of twenty questions: ten
questions on general knowledge followed by ten questions on economic knowledge.
The set of questions used in the training period was composed of ten questions some of
which were used in Biais et al. (2005)’s experiment plus 10 questions on economic culture.
In this training period, the subjects were provided with a reference interval for each question
that they could be 100% sure the correct answer belonged to. Subjects had to give an
interval included in the reference interval. Each player received an initial endowment of
2000 ECUs (knowing that they would be converted into euros at the end of the experiment
at the rate of 1 euro for 100 ECUs) before beginning to answer the questions but after having
received instructions. They were told that 100 ECUs were at stake for each one of the twenty
questions resulting in a loss framing. The payoﬀs are expressed in experimental currency
(ECU). The payoﬀ rule applied for each question was the following :
payment =
8
> > > <
> > > :
 100 
width of the interval provided
width of the interval of reference if the correct answer belongs
to the interval provided
 100 otherwise
According to this formula, the payoﬀ is maximal and equal to 0 when the interval provided
by the subject is a unique value, this value being the right answer to the question. In this
3Think, for example, of an incentive scheme that would pay a high reward if the diﬀerence between the
required percentage of hit rates, say 90%, and the actual hit rate (measured over a set of 10 questions) is
small. A rational subject can use very wide intervals for 9 questions and a very small one for the remaining
question. He is thus certain to appear correctly calibrated, while he is not.
2case, the subject keeps the total 100 ECUs at stake for the question considered. If the
subject provides the reference interval and consequently takes no risk at all, he loses the 100
points at stake for the question. There is therefore a trade-oﬀ between the risk taking and
the amount of ECUs a subject could keep if the correct answer fell inside his interval. High
risk taking is rewarded by a small loss in the case where the answer belongs to the interval
provided. Conversely, a subject who only takes little risk will only keep a few ECUs even if
the correct answer does belong to his interval.
Subjects received feedback providing them with the intervals chosen by all the participants
(including themselves) ranked by width from the narrower to the wider as well as the payoﬀ
corresponding to each interval. They could infer from this feedback whether they had taken
too much risk compared to the others. They could also see the ranking of everybody’s score
after each question so as to trigger a sense of competition.
After they had answered all 20 questions, subjects received general feedback about the
ﬁrst step of the experiment.
People being miscalibrated, we expected them to realize it when they saw that the correct
answer fell outside their interval less or more often than they had expected, which resulted
in a loss of money. As a result, we expected them to better adjust the level of risk they
wished to take for the next questions.
2.2 The standard calibration task
In the next stage, the subjects who had participated in the training period were asked to
answer a set of ten questions (ﬁve questions on general knowledge followed by ﬁve questions
on economic knowledge) by giving their best estimation of the answer and then by providing
10%, 50% and 90% conﬁdence intervals. Subjects in the control group had to complete the
same task. Before the beginning, subjects were explained in detail what were 10%, 50% and
90% conﬁdence intervals. They were also told that they would receive remuneration regarding
this task but that they would only know how the remuneration was established later. As in
Cesarini et al. (2006), since it is impossible to ﬁnd an incentive-compatible payoﬀ scheme for
providing conﬁdence intervals 4, their remuneration for the calibration tasks depended on
the evaluation the subjects were asked to make afterwards of their and the average subject’s
performance during the calibration task. There was no feedback between the questions.
3 Results
The experiment took place at the laboratory of experimental economics of the University of
the Sorbonne (Paris 1) in July 2007. 87 subjects, most of whom were students, participated
in the experiment. 53 students went through the training period before they completed the
calibration task, while the control group was composed of 34 subjects. The average earning
was 11.16 euros. On average, subjects earned 10.62 euros including a 5 euros show-up fee in
the control group and 14.24 euros (8.42 for the training period and 5.82 for the calibration
4see footnote 3
3task) with no show-up fee for the trained group. One can notice that the payoﬀs for the
calibration task are very similar for the control and the trained group (respectively 5.62
and 5.82 euros). Nevertheless, remember that these earnings do not correspond to how
well calibrated participants are but to their ability to predict ex post how well they were
calibrated. In consequence, the fact that earnings are very similar across treatments does
not mean that subjects did not learn to calibrate better.
3.1 General results on calibration
We ﬁnd that the subjects from the control group exhibit a high level of miscalibration.
Indeed, a lot more than one correct answer out of ten belong to the 10% intervals while
fewer than ﬁve correct answers out of ten fall inside the 50% conﬁdence intervals and far
fewer than nine correct answers out of ten fall inside the 90% intervals. The average hit
rates in the control group at the 10%, 50% and 90% levels are respectively 2.03, 3.32 and
4.81. T-tests show that the observed hit rates signiﬁcantly (p<0.001 for the 3 tests) diﬀer
from the expected hit rates (respectively 1, 5 and 9 at the 10%, 50% and 90% levels).
At the 10% level, people are found to be under-conﬁdent, meaning that they provide too
wide intervals. As a result, the correct answer belongs too often to the 10% intervals. This
result was expected by Cesarini et al. (2006). At the 50% and 90% levels conversely, subjects
display overconﬁdence as their intervals are too narrow, this is all the more the case for 90%
conﬁdence intervals (in line with the results of Glaser et al. (2005)).
Comparing the level of miscalibration we get to those found in other studies,
A surprising feature is that, when asked to evaluate how many correct answers belong
to their intervals, the average answers are respectively at the 10%, 50% and 90% levels:
3.47, 5.56 and 8.04 for the control group. Subjects exhibit overconﬁdence for the calibration
task, thinking that they were more cautious than they actually were. Let us, nevertheless,
observe that subjects do predict that their calibration is far from being perfect, otherwise
their evaluations would have been 1, 5 and 9.
These results indicate that not only are people unable to adjust the width of their intervals
to the risk level indicated (they are miscalibrated) but they are also unable to predict their
bias correctly (they are over or underconﬁdent).
To sum up, people seem to overestimate their underconﬁdence and underestimate their
overconﬁdence.
3.2 The eﬀect of training on miscalibration and conﬁdence in cali-
bration
Trained subjects have only slightly higher hit rates at the 10%, 50% and 90% level than
subjects from the control group. The diﬀerences in hit rates between the control and the
trained group are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent at any reasonable level. 5
5The hit rates are respectively at the 10%, 50% and 90% levels 2.03, 3.32 and 4.81 for the control group
and 2.40, 3.80 and 5.33 for the trained group. To get an idea of levels of miscalibration found in other
4We ﬁnd that the median 10% interval width is larger for the trained group than for the
control group for 7 questions out of ten. For the 3 remaining questions, the median width of
intervals is equal across treatments. Note that this goes in the sense of a worsening of the
underconﬁdent miscalibration observed at 10% as people tend to provide too wide intervals
at 10%. One reason why we may ﬁnd such a result is that subjects may not consider the
underconﬁdent miscalibration as a bias and consequently, they may not try to correct it.
The same result is found when we compare median widths of 50% intervals (wider inter-
vals in the trained group than in the control group for 7 questions, the reverse for 1 question
and equal median intervals across treatments for the 2 remaining questions). As for 90%
intervals, for six questions out of ten the interval width is larger for the trained group while
the control group provided wider intervals than the trained group for 1 question. 6
It may be interesting to study the link between the "theoretical" distribution of hit rates
of a perfectly calibrated subject (who has a 90% chance for an answer to fall into any of
his 90% conﬁdence intervals...) and the one we actually observe. We report two ﬁgures
showing the theoretical and actual distributions of 90% intervals hit rates for women and
men. Those ﬁgures make miscalibration very prominent. We then ran a two-sample median
test, separately for women and men, on the distributions of hit rates in the control and the
training groups. We ﬁnd that our training has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on men’s 90% calibration
(p=0.089) while no signiﬁcant eﬀect is found for women. Men’s 90% calibration is improved
by our training which can be seen on ﬁgure 1 by the shift in the distributions of hit rates
between the control and the training treatments. No eﬀect is found for miscalibration at the
10% and 50% levels.
We ran logistic regressions of the dummies ICA10 ("the 10% interval contains the correct
answer"), ICA50 and ICA90 on the same variables (see Table 1). We observe that the
treatment signiﬁcantly increases the probability for the correct answer to fall in the 50% and
90% intervals provided for almost all of the questions (the interaction terms between the
questions and the treatment are always positive and almost always signiﬁcant). It is true
but to a smaller extent for the 10% intervals. If anything, our treatment seems to make
subjects provide wider intervals (even if this result is far from always reaching signiﬁcance)
studies, notice that Russo and Schoemaker (1992) obtained hit rates at the 90% level between 4.2 and 6.2,
while Klayman et al. (1999) found 4.3. However, the level of miscalibration is obviously very sensitive to the
set of questions used. Since half the questions we used were taken from Biais et al [2005], we can compare
the level of miscalibration we found to those of that study. Using no incentive, the average 90% hit rate
in their study is 3.6 while we ﬁnd respectively 4.8 and 5.3 in our control (where subjetcs no they will get
a payment but have to wait until the end of the calibration task to ﬁnd out how it will be calculated) and
training (where subjects are in the same situation and previously went through the training period) group.
It therefore seems like the presence of incentives does increase hit rates.
6If we compare average interval widths, which seems less relevant as averages are sensitive to extreme
values, we ﬁnd that for 7 (6) questions out of ten the average width of 10% and 50% (respectively 90%)
intervals are larger for the trained subjects, while for the remaining 3 (respectively 4) questions, the opposite
is true.
As variances of interval widths are often very diﬀerent across the control and trained group and as a way
of eliminating the inﬂuence of extreme values, we ran a Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test. We found that the
90% interval widths are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent (either at the 1%, 5% or 10% levels) for 5 questions out of ten
while 10% and 50% intervals widths are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent respectively for 3 and 6 questions out of ten.
5Figure 1. Theoretical hit rates and actual
hit rates of men from control and trained
group.
Figure 2. Theoretical hit rates and actual
hit rates of women from control and trained
group.
and it signiﬁcantly helps subjects catch the correct answer in their conﬁdence intervals more
often. Consequently, the incentives we provided during a short training period decrease the
overconﬁdent miscalibration we observe for the 50% and 90% intervals but, to a smaller
extent, makes the underconﬁdent miscalibration noticed for the 10% intervals worse.
Table I. Logistic Regression of "the 10, 50, 90% interval contains the correct answer"
(ICA10 ICA50 ICA90)
Variable ICA10 ICA50 ICA90 Variable ICA10 ICA50 ICA90
Intercept -0.7402 0.4416 1.3924 q8 -1.1865 -1.8656 -1.4668
(0.2799) (0.4948) (0.0392) (0.0656) (0.0019) (0.0171)
Sexe 0.0412 0.3924 0.0738 q9 -1.7349 -2.3641 -2.3985
(0.8915) (0.1391) (0.7711) (0.0190) (0.0002) (0.0002)
treatment -0.5951 -1.5940 -1.1804 q10 -1.7381 -1.9947 -1.9420
(0.2896) (0.0048) (0.0485) (0.0188) (0.0011) (0.0020)
sextreatment 0.1398 -0.0941 0.2821 q2t 0.8536 1.7735 0.0282
(0.7124) (0.7764) (0.3801) (0.2290) (0.0152) (0.9776)
Age 0.00302 0.00324 -0.00832 q3t 0.8063 2.5884 1.5503
(0.9108) (0.8895) (0.7117) (0.3400) (0.0018) (0.0441)
Education 0.0507 0.0773 0.0350 q4t 0.7633 2.1252 1.5607
(0.4971) (0.2327) (0.5801) (0.2941) (0.0032) (0.0345)
q2 0.2337 -0.3636 1.2972 q5t 0.7561 2.3399 1.6269
(0.6766) (0.5381) (0.1441) (0.4115) (0.0014) (0.0279)
q3 -1.3719 -2.8147 -2.3541 q6t -0.7081 1.2329 0.6230
(0.0447) (<.0001) (0.0003) (0.4120) (0.1041) (0.3992)
q4 -0.4377 -1.5713 -1.3416 q7t 1.3228 2.1902 1.2944
(0.4481) (0.0074) (0.0291) (0.0935) (0.0034) (0.0833)
q5 -1.7691 -1.8656 -1.4668 q8t 1.0284 2.2127 1.5161
(0.0167) (0.0019) (0.0171) (0.1977) (0.0026) (0.0404)
q6 -0.7728 -1.8656 -1.3416 q9t 1.0319 2.3218 2.5139
(0.1985) (0.0019) (0.0291) (0.2509) (0.0027) (0.0010)
q7 -1.1124 -1.9534 -1.7502 q10t 1.5328 2.3593 1.6794
(0.0856) (0.0015) (0.0052) (0.0804) (0.0015) (0.0246)
Note: p-values are in brackets.
This general picture masks some strong heterogeneity across subjects. We can control
for several sources of heterogeneity. However, the gender variable captures almost all of it.
We observe indeed that there is virtually no improvement in women’s calibration especially
when we compare the median hit rates between the treatments while men increase their
median hit rate by 0.5 point at the 50% level and by 1 point at the 10% and 90% levels.
The diﬀerence in interval width between the control and the training treatment seems to
be larger for men than for women, indicating that men learned more than women to reduce
6their overconﬁdence. Using a Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test, we ﬁnd that 10% conﬁdence
intervals are signiﬁcantly wider for the trained group respectively for ﬁve questions out of
ten and zero question out of ten for men and women. Let us notice that in the trained
group both men and women had more than one correct answer inside their 10% intervals
exhibiting underconﬁdent miscalibration. As a result, an increase of 10% intervals causes an
aggravation of underconﬁdence. For 50% intervals, the width increases signiﬁcantly between
the control and the training treatments respectively for two and six questions out of ten.
Finally, concerning 90% intervals, the diﬀerence is signiﬁcant in three cases and four cases
out of ten respectively for women and men.
4 Discussion and conclusion
This paper contributes to a literature interested in cognitive biases having economic conse-
quences. We focus on miscalibration, a very robust bias correlated with losses on experi-
mental ﬁnancial markets and bad entrepreneurship.
In line with the existing literature on miscalibration, our subjects strongly suﬀer from the
miscalibration bias, their 50% and 90% intervals being too narrow (overconﬁdent miscali-
bration). We ﬁnd that subject’s 10% intervals are too wide (underconﬁdent miscalibration).
These results are widespread in the population according to the literature and there are very
few exceptions. Furthermore, subjects overestimate their underconﬁdence and underestimate
their overconﬁdence. The fact that people overestimate their underconﬁdent miscalibration
could mean that they do not consider it as a bias. Maybe being too cautious is seen as a
good thing. Previous attempts to reduce miscalibration relied on very long and repetitive
training periods.
Our thirty-minute training punishing miscalibrated behavior by money losses results in an
improvement of calibration at the 50% and 90% levels but the underconﬁdent miscalibration
observed at the 10% level is made worse by the training. Some consequences can be drawn.
It is unlikely that miscalibration disappears in a market environment, since we provided the
kind of incentives that are expected on real markets. According to our results, real traders
are likely to underestimate the risk they take when they think they invested in a very secure
asset. Symmetrically they take less risks than they think when they invest in risky assets.
So, the overall eﬀect of miscalibration on real markets is ambiguous. Furthermore, we ﬁnd
that men’s calibration can be improved by our training period, while women’s cannot. The
incentives we implemented had no eﬀect on women. There are probably many incentives one
could think of that would have a diﬀerential eﬀect on men and women. Women traders may
need either a longer training period which would give them more time to get rid of their
miscalibration or a diﬀerent kind of incentives they would react to.
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